In ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 2022-1755, -2221 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 6, 2024) (“ParkerVision III”), the Federal Circuit held that, due to the difference in burdens of proof in PTAB IPR proceedings and in district court cases, collateral estoppel cannot be applied in a district court case based on findings made
Back in 2016, the Federal Circuit held that a petitioner retains the ability, after an adverse Patent Trial and Appeal Board decision, to assert un-instituted invalidity grounds it presented in its petition. The court reasoned that when the Board chooses not to institute certain petitioned grounds (e.g., due to redundancy), the petitioner could not have raised those grounds during the AIA trial and, therefore, cannot be estopped from pursuing those attacks in later litigation. Shaw Indus. Grp. v. Automated Creel Sys., 817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Continue Reading Estoppel Evolves
When the America Invents Act was enacted, one of the biggest questions facing petitioners was the scope of the estoppel set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 315(e). While IPR was expected to provide a cheaper, more efficient method of challenging the validity of a patent, what would the challenger be giving up?
The statute provides that for any patent claim addressed in a final written IPR decision the petitioner (or real party in interest), may not request, maintain, or assert that any such claim is invalid on a ground that the petitioner “raised or reasonably could have raised” during the IPR in any proceeding before the patent office, or in any action in the district courts or the ITC. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e). The legislative history of the statute suggests that Congress intended a broad application of estoppel. See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. S1375, 1358 (Daily Ed. March 8, 2011) (Statement of Senator Grassley) (indicating that inter partes review “will completely substitute for at least the patents-and-printed publications portion of the civil litigation”).Continue Reading AIA Estoppel – 7 Things We Know So Far
A judgment in an interference disposes of all issues that were, or by motion could have properly been, raised and decided. A losing party who could have properly moved for relief on an issue, but did not so move, may not take action in the Patent Office after the judgment that is inconsistent with that party’s failure to move. 37 C.F.R. § 41.127. This is known as “interference estoppel,” and was recently applied by the PTAB in partially denying an IPR petition. See Adama Makhteshim Ltd. v. Finchimica S.p.A., IPR2016-00577 (PTAB May 24, 2016) (order partially instituting IPR). The decision is important because it is a rare example of the PTAB’s consideration and application of interference estoppel to other Patent Office proceedings, including AIA trials.
Continue Reading PTAB Applies Interference Estoppel to Deny IPR Grounds